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The illegal entry of aliens into the United States is a significant na-
tional problem. Hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens annually enter
this country.' Although the federal government can inspect everyone
coming into the United States to determine their citizenship, 2 this pro-
cedure has not succeeded in eliminating the problem. In order to stem
the flow of illegal aliens, the government has extended its alien check-
ing operations to points removed from the border. In A lmeida-Sanchez
v. United States3 the Supreme Court for the first time addressed the
question of Fourth Amendment protection accorded travelers near but
not at the border.
Unfortunately, Almeida-Sanchez did not end the uncertainty con-
cerning Fourth Amendment standards for nonborder alien searches. 4 A
1. More than a half million of these aliens were apprehended in 1972. 1972 IMMIGRA-
TION & NATURALIZvrION SERVICE (INS) ANN. REP. 7. In 1973, the figure exceeded 650,000.
1973 INS ANN. REP. 8. Most of these aliens (88 percent) entered over the Mexican border.
Id.
2. At the border, neither a warrant nor probable cause is needed to legitimize the
search. See United States v. Alneida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1971) (Browning,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317, 324 (5th
Cir. 1965); United States v. Becker, 347 F. Supp. 1039, 1042 (D. Mass. 1972); Note, Border
Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007, 1008 (1968).
3. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). See Note, The Aftermath of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States:
Automobile Searches for Aliens Take on a New Look, 10 CALIF. W.L. REV. 657 (1974);
The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 196 (1973); 51 J. URBAN L. 556 (1974);
Comment, Extended Border Searches and Probable Cause: Aleida-Sanchez v. United
States, 1973 WAsti. U.L.Q. 889.
4. Two basic issues with respect to Aleida-Sanchez remain unsettled. One of these
is the scope of the decision, the other is retroactivity. It is unclear whether Almeida-
Sanchez invalidated all border patrol traffic checking operations conducted away from
the border without probable cause, or only roving searches so conducted. The Ninth
Circuit has concluded that all such operations are governed by Alneida-Sanchez, includ-
ing checkpoint searches. United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
-13 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1974) (No. 73-6848). In addition, there is disagreement over
whether Ahneida-Sanchez applies only to searches conducted under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3)
(1970), or whether it also affects the interrogation power granted to the border patrol by
id. § 1357(a)(1). The Ninth Circuit has held that § 1357(a)(1) is limited by Ahneida-
Sanchez. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43
U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1974) (No. 74-114). That decision creates a conflict among the
circuits. Compare id., with United States v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229((10th Cir. 1974) (§
1357(a)(1) interrogation power is unaffected by Ahneida-Sanchez).
The retroactive application of Almeida-Sanchez is also uncertain. The Ninth Circuit
applied Almeida-Sanchez retroactively to roving searches, but gave it prospective effect
in cases involving searches conducted at fixed checkpoints. Compare United States v.
1Peltier, 500 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974)
(No. 73-2000) (retroactivity for roving searches), with United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d
960 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1974) (No. 73-6848)
(prospective application to checkpoint searches). Bowen accords with the Fifth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Miller, 492 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1974). However, the Ninth Circuit
appears to have reversed itself by giving Bowen retroactive application. United States v.
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major problem with the decision is the lack of consensus on the Court
concerning the applicable Fourth Amendment requirements. Al-
though joining the majority opinion in Alneida-Sanchez, Justice
Powell also filed a concurring opinion in which he proposed a Fourth
Amendment analysis based on the administrative inspection model of
Camara v. Municipal Court.6 The A lmeida-Sanchez concurrence was
endorsed by the four dissenters as well as an undesignated number
of the other Justices. 7 Thus, Justice Powell's concurrence has the sup-
port of a majority of the Court and may become law in a future case.
The issue posed by the A lmeida-Sanchez concurrence is not a nar-
row question of border patrol power in the region adjacent to the
Mexican border. The appropriate sections of Title 8 and the Code
of Federal Regulations define the ambit of Immigration and Natural-
ization Service (INS) authority as 100 air miles inland from any ex-
ternal border of the United States.8 In addition to the Mexican border,
searches of the type proposed by the Almeida-Sanchez concurrence
Ortiz (9th Cir. June 19, 1974), cert granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1974) (No.
73-2050).
As noted in United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 408 (S.D. Cal. 1973): "Since
Almeida-Sanchez,... this area of the law has been characterized by extreme instability."
See generally Note, Extended Border Searches by Immigration Officers: United States v.
Thompson, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143, 151-52 (1974); 27 VAND. L. REV. 523 (1974).
5. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Douglas,
Brennan, Marshall, and Powell joined. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion. Justice
White filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun
and Rehnquist joined.
6. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
7. 413 U.S. at 270 n.3. This observation has been expressed by law review commentary.
See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1, 196 (1973). The INS has noted
the significance of Almeida-Sanchez:
In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Powell indicated his belief that a judicial officer
would issue a warrant for a roving search on a particular road or roads for a
reasonable period of time. Since this view was approved by the four dissenting Jus-
tices, and by an undesignated number of the other Justices, the so-called 'area search
warrant' apparently is supported by a majority of the Supreme Court.
1973 INS ANN. REP. 16.
8. With respect to powers of the INS, 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1970) provides:
(a) Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations prescribed by
the Attorney General shall have power without warrant-
(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to
be or to remain in the United States;
(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United
States, to board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of
the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance or vehicle, and within
twenty-five miles from such external boundary to have access to private lands,
but not dwellings, for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent illegal
entry of aliens into the United States; and
(4) to make arrests for felonies which have been committed and which are cog-
nizable under any law of the United States regulating the admission, exclusion,
or expulsion of aliens ....
The Attorney General has authorized Border Patrol agents to act as Immigration officers,
8 C.F.R. § 103.1(i) (1974). The "reasonable distance" mentioned in § 1357(a)(3) is 100 air
miles. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1974).
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could occur anywhere within 100 air miles of the Canadian border or
the Atlantic, Pacific or Gulf coasts, or the perimeters of Alaska and
Hawaii. Upon a proper showing, the INS might obtain area warrants
to search any and all vehicles on any roads within such border zones.
Probable cause or even reasonable suspicion to believe that any par-
ticular vehicle contained illegal aliens would be irrelevant. I
Envisioning such a broad scope of INS activity is not idle specula-
tion. The INS has announced efforts to augment its alien detection
operations in areas removed from the Mexican border, particularly in
urban areas where aliens congregate.0 Moreover, area searches could
conceivably be employed as a tactic in pursuit of targets other than
illegal aliens.
The possible creation of a Fourth Amendment free-fire zone around
the United States, and the continuing relevance of Almeida-Sanchez
for pending cases,' 0 require that the Powell concurrence be closely
scrutinized. This Note contends that the analogy between alien searches
in border zones and administrative inspections is unpersuasive, so that
procedures which render administrative inspections constitutional fail
to justify alien searches. Part I will outline the majority opinion and
the concurrence in Almeida-Sanchez. Part II will distinguish that case
from Camara, thereby demonstrating the inapplicability of Camara's
administrative search rationale to the situation of roving alien searches
in Almeida-Sanchez.
I. Almeida-Sanchez
On April 30, 1970, federal officers stopped Condrado Almeida-
Sanchez as he drove on Route 78 in southern California. Although
they had neither probable cause nor a warrant," the officers, acting
in their capacity as border patrol agents of the INS, 12 searched the car
in an effort to find illegal aliens.
Although no aliens were uncovered, discovery of a cache of mari-
juana under the rear seat of the car served as probable cause to con-
duct a thorough vehicular search, which netted 73 kilograms of the
9. Concerning their area control programs, the INS reported:
Again in 1972 an increasing number of aliens in illegal status was located in the
interior areas of the United States. To meet the need for intensified controls in this
vital area of operational concern, investigative area control forces were significantly
strengthened in most of the major urban areas of the nation.
1972 INS ANN. REP. 8.
10. See note 4 supra.
11. 413 U.S. at 268.
12. See note 8 supra.
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illegal drug."1 Almeida-Sanchez was later convicted of concealing and
transporting illegally imported marijuana.' 4 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the conviction, ruling that the search had been legal. 15
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
and held that without consent or probable cause, the warrantless search
violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. The Court con-
sidered and rejected four possible justifications for the initial search
of Almeida-Sanchez's car. Because the federal agents did not have
probable cause, the search was not justifiable within the special Fourth
Amendment doctrine for automobile searches. 16 Neither was it a bor-
der search. At ,the time of his arrest, Almeida-Sanchez was 25 miles
from the Mexican border, on a road that neither crossed the border
nor came closer to it than 20 miles.'7 Moreover, because there was
neither a warrant nor consent, the search was held not to qualify as a
valid administrative inspection.'
Eliminating these grounds of support for the search of Almeida-San-
chez's car, the Court's only remaining consideration was the statute
empowering the INS to search.19 The Court, stating that any other
13. See United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 413 U.S.
266 (1973).
14. Act of July 18, 1956, ch. 629, 70 Stat. 570 (now repealed).
15. United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971). See Note, Border
Search in the Ninth Circuit: Almeida-Sanchez-A Borderline Decision, 23 HASTINGS L.J.
1309 (1972).
16. The automobile search doctrine originated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925). In general, it permits a warrantless search of a car "where it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." Id. at 153. However, as Justice
Stewart wrote in Almeida-Sanchez, Carroll "does not declare a field day for the police in
searching automobiles. Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for
the search." 413 U.S. at 269. See generally Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of
Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REv. 835 (1974).
17. 413 U.S. at 267-68. Moreover, the search did not take place at a functional equiva-
lent of the border. As defined in the majority opinion, a functional equivalent of the
border is any place where it is reasonably certain that all persons present have just
entered the United States. For example, one type of functional equivalent is an inter-
section "marking the confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border...."
Id. at 273. In this example, the absence of local traffic makes it reasonable for the
government to exercise the full power to search associated with the border itself. In
Almeida-Sanchez the road on which petitioner was stopped never crossed the border, and
therefore the requisite nexus was lacking.
18. The government had relied on Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967),
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), and United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), to establish their contention that an alien search was an
administrative inspection and hence did n6t require probable cause or a warrant. How-
ever, Justice Stewart found no support for the government in those cases. Under Caln-
ara, a valid administrative search requires either a warrant or consent. Colonnade in-
volved the sale of liquor and Biswell concerned the sale of guns, so both pertained to a
governmentally regulated business; in such a business, the proprietor, in obtaining per-
mission to enter the regulated field, implicitly gives his consent to be inspected by the
government. See 413 U.S. at 270-71.
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1970) (for text of this section, see note 8 supra.)
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interpretation would render the statute unconstitutional, construed
the Act to mean that the power to search without a warrant was
limited to cases where there was probable cause or consent to search.
2 0
Because there had not been probable cause, consent, or a warrant,
Almeida-Sanchez's conviction was reversed.
Justice Powell concurred in the reversal of the conviction and joined
the majority opinion. He also filed a concurring opinion in which
he attempted to harmonize the government's need to search with the
individual's right of privacy. Basing his approach on Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 1 he sought to fashion a procedure whereby future rov-
ing alien searches might be rendered constitutional.
Justice Powell's analysis involved two parts. The first was an in-
quiry into "whether some functional equivalent of probable cause
may exist for the type of search conducted in this case. ' 12 2 Camara
established three criteria for determining whether a particular search
might be conducted upon some showing less than strict probable cause.
These criteria were a history of judicial and public acceptance of
the type of search, the need to conduct this search in light of alterna-
tives available to protect the governmental interest, and the limited
intrusiveness of the search upon the individual's privacy.23 Justice
Powell took judicial notice of the acceptance of roving auto searches
by the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, where
the problem of illegal aliens is most serious. Need to conduct the
search was established by the government's showing that no alternative
was reasonably possible. Finally, Justice Powell advanced three reasons
for concluding that roving searches for aliens were only modest im-
positions on individual privacy. First, most illegal aliens apprehended
in the United States are deported rather than prosecuted, which evi-
dences a nonprosecutorial intent on the part of the government. Sec-
ond, these searches are incidental to protection of the border, and
therefore some of the special qualities of border searches inhere in
roving alien searches. Third, searches of automobiles are inherently
less intrusive than searches of people or buildings. Thus, concluding
that Camara's criteria were met by roving alien searches, Justice Powell
20. 413 U.S. at 273.
21. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
22. 413 U.S. at 277. "Functional equivalent" of probable cause is the term Justice
Powell assigned to the justification found by the Camara Court for conducting ad-
ministrative inspections. Analogous to the stricter requirement of traditional probable
cause to conduct a search for evidence of a crime, "functional equivalent" is the Fourth
Amendment standard upon which a search warrant may be based in the context of an
administrative inspection.
23. 387 U.S. at 537. See 413 U.S. at 278.
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decided that there could be a functional equivalent of probable
cause to conduct such searches.
2 4
Having affirmatively answered the first Camara inquiry, Justice
Powell next considered whether a warrant was needed. Camara held
that "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of
private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it
has been authorized by a valid search warrant."20 In an administrative
inspection, a warrant is required unless there would be such difficulty
in obtaining it that the governmental purpose would be frustrated.20
The Almeida-Sanchez concurrence, following Camara, decided that a
warrant is required for a roving alien search.
27
II. A lmeida-Sanchez and Camara Distinguished
A. Camara v. Municipal Court
Roland Camara refused to permit municipal housing inspectors to
enter his residence. This refusal violated a municipal ordinance, and
Camara was convicted of that offense. The United States Supreme
Court reversed his conviction, holding that a warrantless search by
building inspectors violated the Fourth Amendment. 28 In deciding
Camara, the Court overruled its earlier decision in Frank v. Mary-
land,29 which held such inspections to be constitutional, even though
conducted without search warrants.
In ruling that the Fourth Amendment did not require search
warrants in this situation, Frank reasoned that administrative searches
24. 413 U.S. at 278-79.
25. 387 U.S. at 528-29.
26. Id. at 533.
27. 413 U.S. at 279-85. The governmental purpose would not be frustrated, Justice
Powell reasoned, because roving searches were always planned in advance. Id. at 283.
Moreover, the problem of obtaining a warrant to search a moving object, such as an
auto, was not present here, because the information needed to procure an area search
warrant would concern "obviously non-mobile sections of a particular road or area
embracing several roads." Id. at 282. Justice Powell suggested several factors relevant in
deciding whether a showing of probable cause has been made:
(i) the frequency with which aliens illegally in the country are known or reasonably
believed to be transported within a particular area;
(ii) the proximity of the area in question to the border;
(iii) the extensiveness and geographic characteristics of the area, including the roads
therein and the extent of their use, and
(iv) the probable degree of interference with the rights of innocent persons, taking
into account the scope of the proposed search, its duration, and the concentration
of illegal alien traffic in relation to the general traffic of the road or area.
Id. at 283-84 (footnote omitted).
28. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). For an insightful analysis of
Camara, see La Fave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara
and See Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
29. 359 U.S. 360 (1959), overruled, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
360
Vol. 84: 355, 1974
Area Search Warrants in Border Zones
were of a special kind. No evidence of crime was sought, no other
means were available to promote the public health, safety and wel-
fare, and the type of search in question had historically been an ac-
cepted practice.30 Camara conceded these points but, rather than ac-
cepting Frank's conclusion that they excused building inspections
from the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, considered
them in determining the reasonableness of the search. 31 Borrowing
from Justice Douglas's dissent in Frank, the Court in Camara
decided that a constitutionally permissible housing inspection need
not be based on information concerning any particular building, but
instead could be justified on an assessment of the conditions in the
neighborhood at large.32 Appropriate factors to consider include the
age, nature, occupancy and ownership of the building, the time elapsed
since the last inspection, and the general condition of the area. Upon
evaluating the data presented by the agency seeking the warrant, the
magistrate would decide if the program of administrative searches was
reasonable. 33 Camara envisioned primary reliance on the individual's
consent, however, with resort to warrants only after entry was denied.
34
B. The Almeida-Sanchez Search Does Not Fit the Camara Model
To determine if the Almeida-Sanchez concurrence is supported by
Camara requires an examination of the threshold question of whether
there can be a functional equivalent of probable cause for random rov-
ing alien searches. Application of Camara's three criteria of history,
need, and limited intrusiveness demonstrates that random roving alien
searches are not searches for which a functional equivalent of proba-
ble cause can exist.
1. History of Judicial Acceptance
Justice Powell's concurrence in A lmeida-Sanchez relied upon a his-
tory of judicial acceptance of roving alien searches as support for his
conclusion that there could be a functional equivalent of probable
cause. However, that history is significantly different from the tradi-
tion of judicial responses to building inspections that the Court con-
sidered in Camara. Almeida-Sanchez was decided by the Court only 27
years after the statutory authority for INS roving alien searches had
30. 359 U.S. at 366-67, 371-72.
31. 387 U.S. at 531-34.
32. Id. at 535, 536, 538.
33. Id. at 538.
34. Id. at 539-40.
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been created.35 During that period, only a very few cases in the Ninth
and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals had explicitly approved alien
searches conducted away from the border without probable cause."
The first time it considered the question, the Court held that such
searches were unconstitutional. Although the prior circuit court ap-
proval of these searches is technically a history of judicial acceptance,
it is insignificant in comparison with the history supporting the
Camara court. Camara involved a practice that not only had been ac-
cepted for more than 150 years, 37 but also had been previously upheld
by the Court in Frank v. Maryland. In making historical acceptance
one criterion of reasonableness, the Camara Court had before it a
longer and more authoritative history than the brief record of lower
court approval considered persuasive by the Almeida-Sanchez con-
currence. Properly viewed, the majority opinion in A lmeida-Sanchez
conforms this area to traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine, with
the prior history of random roving alien searches constituting a brief
aberration from that tradition.38
2. Need to Conduct the Search
The second criterion the A lmeida-Sanchez concurrence applied to
random roving alien searches was the need to conduct the search.
Justice Powell defined "need" as "the absence of other methods for
vindicating the public interest . . ."39 The concurrence did not
consider or evaluate any alternatives. Rather, it found that the gov-
ernment had made "a convincing showing . . . that roving checks
of automobiles are the only feasible means" of apprehending certain
classes of border crossers.40 An examination of its brief in Almeida-
Sanchez reveals that the government also failed to suggest or evaluate
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1970) had its origin in the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1946, ch. 768, § 287(a), 60 Stat. 865. See Brief for Appellee at 20-21, Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
36. See United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir. 1971) (Browning,
J., dissenting). Judge Browning noted that the Ninth, and possibly the Tenth, Circuits
were alone among the courts of appeals in failing to impose on the INS a requirement
of probable cause for nonborder alien searches. Moreover, the period of judicial ac-
ceptance of these searches was quite brief; Judge Browning noted that until 1963, even
the Ninth Circuit required probable cause to conduct alien searches that were not border
searches. Id. at 464 n.8. However, as Judge Browning implied, a major difficulty in
analyzing circuit court decisions in this area is that their use of an elastic border con-
cept tended to draw many alien searches not conducted at or near the border into the
rubric of "border search." Talismanic use of the word "border" often justified searches
made without probable cause.
37. 387 U.S. at 537.
38. United States v. Peltier, 500 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W.
3280 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974) (No. 73-2000).
39. 413 U.S. at 278 (Powell, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 276.
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any alternatives to the roving auto search.41 Instead, the brief merely
stated that such operations were "essential" to INS enforcement pro-
gTams. 42 In fact, it is likely that reasonably possible alternatives do
exist. As one example, the majority opinion suggested the use of
fixed checkpoints at border "equivalents."
4 3
Justice Powell's discussion of the absence of alternatives does not
indicate any serious questioning into the assertions of the government.
Rather, the government's lack of proof and the concurrence's one-
sentence treatment of the issue reveal that the questions of real per-
tinence to the problem at hand were virtually ignored. Although fol-
lowing the analytic form of Camara. the Allmeida-Sanchez concurrence
did little to solve the substantive problems raised by the application
of Camara to roving alien searches.
3. Limited Intrusion upon Individual Privacy
The third area of inquiry in the Almeida-Sanchez concurrence
concerned the invasion of privacy entailed by roving auto search.
41. The government should have the burden of proving the existence of an excep-
tional situation when it seeks a modification of Fourth Amendment procedures; cf.
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 324-25 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (government sought power to search
dwelling without search warrant). Accord, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969);
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
456 (1948). It is reasonable to place the burden of proof on the government, because the
government may be regarded as the moving party in seeking a modification of Fourth
Amendment standards. Moreover, the government will probably also be the party best
able to offer evidence as to the existence of an exceptional circumstance. See generally
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 337, at 785-89 (E. Cleary ed. 1972). In such cases, it would
be unreasonable to require a defendant to prove that he was entitled to the protection
of the Fourth Amendment.
,12. See Brief for Appellee at 21-27, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973). It should be noted that all traffic checking operations combined produced con-
siderably less than 10 percent of the total number of deportable aliens located by the
INS in 1972. Id. at 26. See note 1 supra. Fixed and temporary checkpoints, as well as
roving searches contributed to this number. Id. at 23-26. No effort was made by the
government to allocate percentages of the total to each of the traffic checking opera-
tions. "Need" to conduct roving alien searches should properly be defined with respect
to the aailability of reasonable alternatives for detecting the fraction of 10 percent of
all deportable aliens attributable to roving alien searches. When so viewed, the govern-
ment's need to conduct these searches is markedly less significant.
43. 413 U.S. at 273. See note 17 supra. The government was operating only 13 fixed
checkpoints at the time of the search of Almeida-Sanchez. Brief for Appellee at 24,
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). It was not indicated whether these
checkpoints were at functional equivalents.
Another alternative is also feasible. If search without probable cause is permitted at
functional equivalents of borders, then random roving searches without probable cause
should be equally permissible at any point between the border and the farthest point
inland that could be construed to be a functional equivalent. Although no fixed dis-
tance could be established, the permissible range of such a search would be from the
border either to the nearest road that does not cross the border or to the nearest habita-
tion on the United States side, whichever is closer to the border.
This suggestion clearly does not exhaust the possible alternatives available to the INS,
or to the Court, for dealing with the problem of illegal alien traffic. It is included
merely as a contrast to the cursory consideration of need presented by the Almeida-
Sanchez concurrence.
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Camara held that if a search was nonpersonal and not aimed at dis-
covery of evidence of a crime, then it was only modestly intrusive.
4t
Justice Powell's Almeida-Sanchez concurrence advanced three reasons
for finding the random roving alien searches only modestly intrusive.
These were the absence of prosecutorial intent, the density of alien
traffic combined with proximity to the border, and the inherently
less intrusive quality of auto searches.
First, the concurrence found that prosecutorial intent did not un-
derlie the random roving alien searches. However, the phrase "prose-
cutorial intent," as used in the A lmeida-Sanchez concurrence, is mis-
leading.45 As noted above, Camara considered a search to be a limited
invasion of Fourth Amendment privacy when it was not aimed at dis-
covering evidence of a crime. The building code inspections con-
sidered in Camara were of this type because the municipal code did
not make the existence of a building code violation punishable per
se. Rather, prosecution could only be based either on a failure to
correct conditions uncovered during the inspection, or, as in Camara
itself, on refusal to permit inspectors to enter.46 Therefore, detection
of building code violations was not discovery of evidence of a crime.
On the other hand, it is a federal crime to enter the country il-
legally or to aid an illegal entrant.47 Thus, the discovery by INS
44. 387 U.S. at 537.
45. Moreover, the concurrence seems internally inconsistent; notwithstanding the
conclusion that there did not exist prosecutorial intent, it characterized the government's
information upon which a decision to search was based as relating "to criminal activity
in certain areas." 413 U.S. at 281 (Powell, J., concurring).
46. Although § 507 of the San Francisco Building Code is ambiguous, it is clear that
the Camara Court assumed that this section did not impose a criminal penalty solely
because of the existence of violations. The Court noted that the prevailing procedure
for enforcing building codes, such as the one in Camara, involved as an initial matter
the issuance of an administrative compliance order; it is the failure to obey this order,
and not the existence of code violations, that is the criminal offense. 387 U.S. at 531 &
nn.8-9. The only exception to this general rule cited by the Court was a New York
City code provision. Id. at 531 n.7. Significantly, the Court did not cite § 507 of the
San Francisco Building Code as another exception to the general rule. It was therefore
possible for the Court later to regard a search under the San Francisco ordinance as
only a limited intrusion upon the citizen's privacy because it was not aimed at the
discovery of evidence of a crime.
The Court's treatment of the San Francisco Code provision leaves unanswered the
question of whether the decision would have been different if the case had arisen under
the New York code. Moreover, the interpretation of Camara presented in this Note sug-
gests that the Court erred in United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), in relying upon
Camara's administrative inspection rationale in the context of a search for evidence of a
violation of the Federal Gun Control Act of Oct. 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat.
1213.
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1970) provides:
Any alien who (1) enters the United States at any time or place other than as des-
ignated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by immigra-
tion officers, or (3) obtains entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading
representation or the willful concealment of a material fact, shall, for the first corn-
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agents that a person either is an illegal alien or is transporting illegal
alien passengers is the discoveiy of evidence of a crime. The traffic
checking operations at issue in A lmeida-Sanchez were directed at
discovering such evidence, and therefore should fail the Camara test.
If there are to be any principled and intelligible botinds on the
doctrine of administrative searches, Camara's requirement that the
search not be directed at discovering evidence of a crime should
be interpreted to refer to the express statutory language. The A imeida-
Sanchez concurrence injected a new element into the Camara test by
substituting the subjective prosecutorial intent of the government in
place of the explicit wording of the statute. The issue of subjective
prosecutorial intent is not relevant in the context of a search for
evidence of a crime, and traditional probable cause must be established
to validate such a search.
The concurrence also suggested that a low prosecution rate indi-
cates administrative rather than prosecutorial intent. 48 However, even
assuming that the concept of subjective prosecutorial intent is mean-
ingful and relevant here, the use of this low prosecution rate is mis-
leading when considered independently of data on the rate of con-
victions and magnitude of the illegal alien traffic. The concurrence
infers that the government has little desire to prosecute these of-
fenses; from a three percent prosecution figure, however, it is equally
inferrable that immigration cases are difficult to prosecute, and prose-
cutions are limited to cases in which a conviction is relatively certain.
Alternatively, if the cases are not complex and convictions are rela-
tively easy for the government to obtain, the low prosecution rate
may reflect a constraint imposed on the government by limited man-
power and resources relative to the number of illegal aliens appre-
hended. The latter inference is at least as likely as nonprosecutorial
intent; more than 390,000 deportable aliens were located in fiscal
1972,41 of whom 12,799 were prosecuted, ° and the conviction rate
mission ... be guilty of a misdemeanor... and for a subsequent commission ... shall
be guilty of a felony ....
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1970) provides:
Any person .... who-
(1) brings into or lands in the United States..."
(2) knowing that he is in the United States in violation of law..., trans-
ports, or moves, or attempts to transport or move...
(3) willfully or knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields from detection...
(4) willfully or knowingly encourages or induces .... the entry into the
United States of-
any alien ... not duly admitted by an immigration officer... shall be guilty of a
felony ....
48. 413 U.S. at 278.
49. Id. at 294 (White, J., dissenting). This figure is understated. See note 1 supra.
50. 1972 INS ANN. REP. 121.
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in these cases was almost 94 percent.51 Although the percentage of
prosecutions is low, both the absolute number of aliens prosecuted
and the conviction rate are very substantial. Thus, the inference of
subjective nonprosecutorial intent offered by the A lmeida-Sanchez con-
currence is inconclusive at best.
Further, if the issue of subjective intent is relevant at all to this
problem the Court should consider the possibility of abuse inherent in
using a less stringent standard of probable cause for roving alien
searches. These searches might be used as a pretext for dragnets aimed
at the discovery of a wide variety of crimes in which strict probable
cause to search has traditionally been required.
5 2
The second idea in support of Justice Powell's conclusion that
roving alien searches are only modestly intrusive concerned the density
of illegal aliens present in the search area and the proximity of that
area to the border. As in its discussion of the criterion of "need," the
A lmeida-Sanchez concurrence accepted the government's statement that
51. Id. Of the 12,799 aliens prosecuted in 1972, 12,018 were convicted, resulting in a
conviction rate of 93.8 percent.
52. Both judges and commentators have noted the problems, including police perjury,
of searches conducted on various pretexts inconsistent with good faith or constitutional
procedures. See United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 979 (1973); Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 1970), revd, 407 U.S. 143
(1972); Younger, The Perjury Routine, 204 NATION 596, 597 (1967); Note, Police Perjurl,
in the Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap, 60 Go. L.J. 507 (1971); Note,
In Search of the Border: Searches Conducted by Federal Customs and Immigoration
Officers, 5 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 93, 106 (1972) [hereinafter cited as In Search of the
Border]. Although not conclusive on the issue of police pretense or perjury, it is never-
theless instructive to recognize that most challenges to the legitimacy of border patrol
action have involved marijuana convictions arising from alien searches. See, e.g., United
States v. Phillips, 496 F.2d 1395 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Nevarez-Alcantar, 495
F.2d 678 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Martinez-Miramontes, 494 F.2d 808 (9th Cir.
1974); United States v. McKim, 487 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bowman,
487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Maddox, 485 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Byrd, 483 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd on rehearing, 494 F.2d 1281
(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973); United States
v. DeLeon, 462 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 853 (1973); Fumagalli v.
United States, 429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1970); Ramirez v. United States, 263 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir. 1959); United States v. Connor, 364 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d
1241 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Zamora, 364 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
In Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226, 228 (1960), the Court recognized that an
administrative search conducted in bad faith would be an impermissible abuse of the
administrative search authority, but held that in the absence of proof of such bad faith,
the mere potential for abuse would not render the administrative search unconstitu-
tional. The'same conclusion has been reached in cases involving anti-hijacking airport
searches. See United States v. Skipworth, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Muelner, 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972); United States v. Kroll, 351 F. Supp. 148
(W.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp.
1077, 1101 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). However, roving alien checks by the border patrol present a
particularly difficult situation in which to prove bad faith. Because the searching border
patrol agents serve in a dual capacity as both Customs and Immigration officers, they
are permitted to "switch hats" in midsearch. See United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d
1359, 1362 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 1972).
Moreover, if a lesser showing than traditional probable cause is required to authorize
alien checks, the standards for Customs searches are in effect simultaneously weakened.
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there was a high incidence of illegal alien traffic in the border region.
Although the government was attempting to show that relatively few
nonaliens would be affected by searches under such conditions, it
is by no means clear that all, or even most, people searched will be
aliens or alien smugglers. The government did not report the number
of innocent citizens whose rights were violated by illegal searches,
53
nor did it present statistics relating total traffic to total alien traffic
by season of the year, time of day, distance from the border, or any
other factor that might be relevant. Without such data, Justice Powell
should not have uncritically accepted the government's conclusory
assertions.
5 4
The concurrence also reasoned that these searches, because inci-
dental to border protection, share in the extraordinary Fourth Amend-
ment status enjoyed by searches at the border.5 5 In this, the opinion
operates at cross-purposes with other judicial attempts to delineate
the proper Fourth Amendment standards for searches incidental to
border protection. A recurrent problem in such cases has been to de-
termine the permissible distance within the nation's boundaries that
the border exception may run.5 6 Instead of helping to define where
the border ends and where Fourth Amendment rights attach, the
A lmeida-Sanchez concurrence will confuse the inquiry by creating
a quasi-border lying entirely within the boundaries of the nation.
The concurrence's third reason for finding that random roving alien
searches are only modestly intrusive was an assertion that an auto search
53. Some indication is provided by the Brief for Appellee at 25-26, Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). Nearly two million autos were stopped in 1972, and
nearly 400,000 searched thoroughly, to net 39,000 aliens. Thus, approximately 50 cars
were stopped, and 10 searched thoroughly, for each alien found. Moreover, many aliens
enter in groups, assisted by professional alien smugglers. Id. at 23. Because many of the
aliens enter collectively one can only conclude that some multiple of 50 cars are stopped,
and many times 10 are searched, for each alien-bearing vehicle found.
54. In any event, it appears that the statistical inference called for by the Alneida-
Sanchez concurrence would be of dubious reliability. In Camara, the inspections sought
to uncover building code violations. Those violations pertained to physical conditions
that were fixed and immovable. The only way to eliminate a violation in a target build-
ing was to repair it, a result consonant with the aims of inspection. In the case of INS
traffic checks, however, enforcement programs have the effect of driving violators out of
the enforcement areas. 413 U.S. at 286 (White, J., dissenting). The presence of illegal
aliens in a given area may be unrelated to their position at an earlier time. Although a
statistical profile of immigration violations for particular areas might conceivably be
constructed for the purpose of obtaining a warrant, the burden of searches later con-
ducted might nevertheless fall primarily on innocent persons.
55. See note 2 supra.
56. See, e.g., United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1972); Ng Pui
Yu v. United States, 352 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1965); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14,
16 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Yee Ngee How, 105 F. Stipp. 517, 520-21 (N.D. Cal.
1952). Compare United States v. Rodriguez, 195 F. Supp. 513, 516 (S.D. Tex. 1960), afj'd,
292 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1961), with United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cr. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969). See generally In Search of the Border, supra note 52,
at 95, 97.
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entails a lesser invasion of individual privacy than does a search of
a person or building. It cited Chambers v. Maroney57 for the proposi-
tion that "[t]his Court 'has long distinguished between an automobile
and a home or office.' "58 Certainly, such a distinction exists, and it
is recognized by a separate body of doctrine. However, the Fourth
Amendment law on auto searches is not founded on the premise
that these searches are inherently less intrusive than other searches;
rather, it is based on the pragmatic recognition of the difficulty in-
volved in obtaining a warrant to search a moving car.59 Justice Powell,
in arguing that a warrant is constitutionally required for a roving
alien search, accepted that the special Fourth Amendment doctrine
for auto searches was inapposite to the problem at bar. 0 To cite Cham-
bers v. Maroney on the degree of intrusiveness of an auto search mis-
applies the precedent and injects confusion into the legal analysis.
The automobile is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment vanishes.
61
The quality of intrusiveness is less related to the place where search
occurs than it is to the character of the search itself.62 Thus, it is
important to examine the nature of the search proposed by the
Almeida-Sanchez concurrence.
Camara justifies administrative searches, at least in part, because
they impose only a limited intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment right of privacy. Typically, in these searches, nothing is
seized by the government agents, nor is official suspicion focused on
persons.63 The inspections are made on a regular, periodic basis and
57. 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970).
58. 413 U.S. at 279 (Powell, J., concurring).
59. See note 16 supra. But see Cardwell v. Lewis, 94 S. Ct. 2464 (1974), in which it
was stated that an auto search is less intrusive than a search of the home because of the
lesser expectation of privacy associated with automobiles. Note that Cardwell cited
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Ahneida-Sanchez as exclusive authority for thi
statement. Id. at 2469. Note also that there was only a plurality opinion in Cardwell, so
that this view of auto searches does not have majority support. In particular, Justice
Powell concurred in the result but did not express any opinion on the degree of in-
tensiveness of auto searches. The four dissenters (per Stewart, J.) reaffirmed the opinion
of the Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971), that:
The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment
fades away and disappears.
94 S. Ct. at 2473.
60. "The very fact that the Government's supporting information relates to criminal
activity in certain areas rather than to evidence about a particular automobile renders
irrelevant the justification for warrantless searches relied upon by Carroll and its
progeny." 413 U.S. at 281-82 (Powell, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 269; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971).
62. "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
63. See La Fave, supra note 28, at 19.
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do not rely on surprise.0 4 The inspectors are not armed officers, and
their inspections need not occur outside business hours. 5
By contrast, a random roving alien search is personal in nature;
it is a search of an automobile for information about the car's driver
or passengers, rather than for information about the car itself or the
condition of its equipment. The searches are conducted day and
night by armed, uniformed agents of the federal government. They
rely on surprise to trap violators. 6 The searches are not capable of
regular, periodic administration. In comparison to the building in-
spections at issue in Camara, roving alien searches do not belong in
the category of modestly intrusive administrative search.
Camara's standards for administrative inspections may not properly
be applied to the roving alien search in A lmeida-Sanchez. Using area
search warrants in the context of these INS searches would expand
Camara. There is good reason for seeking to limit rather than to ex-
tend the application of Camara.
C. A Critique of Camara
Camara, like Frank before it, recognized an extraordinary rela-
tionship between building code inspections and the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection of personal privacy. The public interest in the pre-
vention and abatement of dangerous or unhealthy conditions in urban
dwellings is incontestable. However, the Fourth Amendment's re-
quirement that a warrant be based upon probable cause to search,"
and the definition of probable cause in terms of specific information, 0
threatened to bar the performance of necessary inspections. The re-
sponse of Frank was to uphold the practice of warrantless building
inspections, regarding them as an exception to the Fourth Amendment.
Camara's response, on the other hand, was to attempt to fit these
searches into the framework of Fourth Amendment law. While the
Camara result is arguably the best accommodation of the competing
64. 387 U.s. at 538-39.
65. Id. at 539-40.
66. Brief for Appellee at 25, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
67. Although the search program might be established on a periodic basis, particular
cars obviously would not be searched with any regularity. See note 54 supra.
68. The Fourth Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
69. See generally Burnett, Evaluation of Affidavits and Issuance of Search Warrants:
A Practical Guide for Federal Magistrates. 64 J. CR1M. L. & CRIW'Y 270 (1973); Note,
Testing the Factual Basis for a Search Warrant, 67 COLUm. L. Rav. 1529 (1967).
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interests, the Camara opinion is nevertheless problematic. The reason-
ing of the Court in Camara is internally inconsistent and at variance
with traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine. This is not to imply
that Camara should be overruled, but only to emphasize that Camara's
reasoning, if applied beyond the exceptional facts of that case, may
lead to a general erosion of Fourth Amendment standards.
Camara's inconsistency lies in its treatment of the Fourth Amend-
ment's requirement of probable cause. The opinion held that "rea-
sonableness" was the overriding standard of the Fourth Amendment.'-
Moreover, the Court stated:
In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant
to search be obtained, 'probable cause' is the standard by which
a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional
mandate of reasonableness.
71
An inspection based on a warrant that did not issue upon probable
cause would be unconstitutional, but traditional probable cause could
not be demonstrated for building inspections. The Camara solution
to this problem was to hold that the conjunction of historical ac-
ceptance, need, and limited intrusion rendered these searches "rea-
sonable." 72 Once reasonableness was established, the Court held that
probable cause must therefore exist, as if probable cause were a corol-
lary to a finding of reasonableness.73 In other words, the Court began
by making reasonableness dependent upon probable cause. It con-
cluded by finding probable cause dependent upon reasonableness.
In this inversion of the relationship between probable cause and
reasonableness, Camara was internally contradictory and departed from
established Fourth Amendment doctrine. As Professor La Fave com-
mented on Camara, "To say that probable cause required by the Fourth
Amendment is not a fixed test, but instead involves a sort of calculus
incorporating all the surrounding circumstances of the intended
search, constitutes a major departure from existing constitutional
doctrine."74
70. 387 U.S. at 528-29.
71. Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 537-38.
73. Id. at 538.
74. La Fave, supra note 28 at 12-13. See Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme
Court: Shadows On the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 664, 677 (1961). In Wyman
v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 341 (1971), Justice Marshall wrote in dissent that "[o]f course,
the Fourth Amendment test is reasonableness, but in determining whether a search is
reasonable, this Court is not free merely to balance, in a totally ad hoc fashion, any
number of subjective factors."
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In United States v. United States District Court,75 Justice Powell
wrote that "the definition of reasonableness turns, at least in part, on
the more specific commands of the warrant clause."7 In a footnote, he
quoted Chimel v. California" to the effect that finding reasonable-
ness from subjective views regarding the acceptability of certain sorts
of police conduct was the kind of unconfined analysis that could
eviscerate the Fourth Amendment. 8 Basically, however, it was this
type of analysis that produced Camara.
Camara was a judicial response to an extraordinary conflict of
public and private interests, and the decision in that case struck a
delicate balance between those interests.79 To some extent, however,
all Fourth Amendment questions involve the same interests, and the
government always presents its case as one of great need. 0 Unless
Camara is limited in its application to searches in which the govern-
ment's need is equally great, historical acceptance equally strong, and
intrusion on personal privacy equally slight, Camara may lead to con-
sequences adverse to the individual's right of privacy.8 ' Adoption of
the standards of the A lmeida-Sanchez concurrence would misapply
Camara and, in so doing, unwisely broaden it.
Conclusion
The problem of illegal alien traffic is undeniably a serious one, but
the way to solve it is not through erosion of the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Powell's concurrence in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, by
misconstruing Camara v. Municipal Court, constitutes a significant
and unjustified departure from Fourth Amendment doctrine.
The roving alien search involved in A lmeida-Sanchez does not meet
the standards established by Camara for defining the type of search that
may be made upon a lesser showing than traditional probable cause.
No sufficiently significant history of judicial acceptance exists for
75. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
76. Id. at 315.
77. 395 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1969).
78. 407 U.S. at 315 n.15.
79. See generally Greenberg, Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment:
A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
1011 (1973).
80. See 413 U.S. at 273.
81. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886):
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely,
by silent approaches and slight deviation from legal modes of procedure.
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these searches, and they are not necessitated by an absence of alterna-
tives. They are personal in nature and aimed at the discovery of
evidence of a crime, and thus involve a more than modest intrusion
on personal privacy.
If the Camara standard is applied to such searches, there is no ra-
tional way to limit the expansion of Camara doctrine. The Camara
reasoning was logically flawed and deviated from established Fourth
Amendment doctrine. The Fourth Amendment's guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures would be better served by a narrow
construction of Camara than by an expansion of that case to permit
the type of search proposed by Justice Powell's concurrence in
Almeida-Sanchez.
